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ABSTRACT. Integrated Pest Management (IPM) is an important component of sustain-
able agriculture. Farmers who switch from a more capital-intensive pesticide-based pest
management strategy to IPM have to substitute capital with labour. The adoption of IPM
will therefore depend, among other things, on the opportunity costs of labour. A simple
model analyses the trade-off between IPM and current farmers’ best practice in devel-
oping countries. Modifications of the model include different forms of labour
organization in pest management, such as owner operated and short- and long-term
labour contracts. The implications are that agricultural policies, environmental policies,
and labour market policies can go hand in hand. Unfortunately, this will be more likely
at a higher level of original pesticide use and hence a higher level of environmental costs.
1. Introduction
Rural areas in developing countries have in common that the labour
market depends to a large extent on the agricultural sector. Furthermore,
most of the rural areas show hidden unemployment. Also, the success of
agriculture depends on the environment which is more fragile in most of
the developing countries than in industrialized countries (World Bank,
1997). Therefore, international donor agencies have placed high priority on
sustainable agriculture and rural development among other objectives to
enhance employment, create income, and protect the environment (World
Bank, 1997; FAO, 1999).
An important component of sustainable agriculture is integrated pest
management (IPM) where farmers are trained to improve their pest man-
agement skills (Norvell and Hammig, 1999). Studies have shown that
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farmers used tools that are part of integrated pest management but tend to
apply pesticides on a regular basis (further called farmers’ best practice,
FBP). This simple strategy often leads to an overuse of pesticides in pest
and disease control from an individual as well as from a social welfare
point of view (e.g. Rola and Pingali, 1993; Waibel and Fleischer, 1998).
While IPM is a complex strategy with no exact definition, the main
message is to reduce pesticide applications (Morse and Buhler, 1997;
Waibel, 1994). The central element of IPM is the observation of the level of
pests and diseases, and the application of pesticides only if necessary. The
IPM strategy substitutes capital (expenses for pesticides) and low skill
labour (time spent on spraying) with high skill labour (observation of pests
and diseases) (Fernandez-Cornejo, 1996; Morse and Buhler, 1997;
Schillhorn van Veen et al., 1998; Pingali and Gerpacio, 1998; van de Fliert
and Proost, 1999). It thus depends on the provision of human capital. The
provision of these skills is part of agricultural strategies in many devel-
oped as well as developing countries (Waibel, 1999). Beside the expected
positive benefits of IPM at farm level, additional external benefits such as
less groundwater pollution and reduced loss in biodiversity are expected
through reduced application of pesticides as compared to FBP (Fernandez-
Cornejo, 1998; Norvell and Hammig, 1999). These benefits are the main
argument for government support (Cuyno and Norton, 2000). One suc-
cessful mode of introducing IPM specifically in developing countries is the
use of farmer field schools (FFS) (Schmidt, Steifel, and Hürlimann, 1997).
The general approach is to train a group of farmers in IPM during a crop-
ping season. Under the guidance of trainers, farmers implement field trials
and compare the results. It is expected that farmers will adopt at least part
of the IPM techniques learned at the FFS (Horstkotte-Wesseler, 1999).
Economic research on IPM strategies has so far concentrated on the
analysis of costs and benefits (e.g. Waibel et al., 1999), their social costs (e.g.
Rola and Pingali, 1993; Antle and Pingali, 1994; Waibel and Fleischer, 1998)
and problems of successfully implementing plant protection strategies
(e.g. Schillhorn van Veen et al., 1998). Farm households have been mod-
elled explicitly or implicitly by assuming perfect substitution between
different kinds of farm labour. Empirical studies on the adoption of IPM in
the United States (McNamara, Wetzstein, and Douce, 1991; Fernandez-
Cornejo, Beach, and Huang, 1994; Fernandez-Cornejo, 1996, 1998) have
shown a significant negative impact of off-farm income on the adoption of
IPM, confirming that opportunity costs of labour are an important variable
in explaining the rate of adoption.
Government policies have been addressed by several authors, but with
the emphasis on regulatory issues of pesticide application, pesticide price
policies, and national extension strategies (Waibel, 1994). As IPM is a
labour-intensive plant protection strategy, labour market policies will have
an impact on the adoption and the costs and benefits of IPM. If those poli-
cies are not congruent they could lead to an inefficient allocation of
resources. Also, the impact is expected to differ among the various forms
of labour organization.
Labour in agriculture is often divided between the owner-operator, his
family members, and hired permanent or seasonal workers. Whether a
438 Volker Beckmann and Justus Wesseler
certain task is carried out by the owner or somebody else depends mainly
on differences in the opportunity costs and transaction costs of labour
(Beckmann, 1996). The fact that the organization of labour may affect the
adoption of innovations was first explored by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943)
and later formalized by Acemoglu (1997). If hired workers must be trained
in order to implement innovations, the problem may arise that ‘an entre-
preneur who invests in training workers may lose capital if these workers
contract with other firms’ (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; c.f. Bardhan and Udry,
1999, p. 161). This may lead to sub-optimal investments in training and a
low rate of innovation.
IPM programs usually avoid this problem by training the owner-oper-
ator. However, if it is not the owner-operator who is applying the
pesticides, differences in the opportunity costs of labour may also affect
the rate of adoption. Low opportunity costs of the person applying the pes-
ticides and high opportunity costs of the decision maker or
owner-operator can be important constraints for the adoption of IPM.
In this paper we will focus on the organization of farm labour and its rel-
evance for the adoption of IPM, a topic which has been neglected in earlier
studies. First of all, a simple theoretical model will be introduced which
describes the circumstances in which an IPM strategy begins to promise
more benefits that FBP. Secondly, the organization of agriculture with
respect to pest management will be described and the different types of
organizational structures introduced into the model. Thirdly, the results of
the model will be compared with respect to labour costs and different
forms of labour organization. The impact of labour market policies on IPM
will be discussed and specifically how they influence the chance of adop-
tion of IPM and how the impact depends on the organizational structure
of agriculture. Finally, non-trivial conclusions for agriculture, environ-
mental, and labour market policies will be drawn.
2. The model
The trade-off between FBP and IPM can be modelled for a cost-minimizing
farmer, who has to decide whether he wants to continue with his current
practice, FBP, or switch to IPM as a perfect substitute while achieving the
same yield level, y¯. From here on we will use the term ‘farmer’ as a proxy
for the person in the farm-household who will be the member of the farm-
household to attend training courses on IPM, who ultimately decides on
the pest and disease control strategy in the field, and who decides who will
do the spraying. The production function is of perfect substitutes tech-
nology f(IPM, FBP)  IPM  FBP. The minimum costs of production
would be c(IPM, FBP, y¯)  min{IPM, FBP}y¯, hence the farmer will switch
to IPM if it is less expensive than FBP. Adopting IPM will be less
expensive, if the benefits, B, from switching to IPM, are greater than the
costs, C, of adoption and not if otherwise. The boundary between adoption
and non-adoption, IPMb, is where B  C. The adoption of IPM can be
written as
IPM  { 1 if B  C
IPM  0 if B  C (1)
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As farmers are aware about the short-term impacts of pesticides on
health (Rola and Pingali, 1993), the benefits of adopting an IPM strategy
from the farmers’ point of view are reduced pesticide and health costs.
Further benefits of reduced pesticide application such as less pollution of
ground water and a positive impact on biodiversity are assumed not to be
part of the farmers’ objective function. The benefits of IPM are modelled by
taking the current pesticide (PC) and health costs (HC) under FBP
weighted with the relative application time saved due to the adoption of
IPM (AS). Deriving the health benefits by weighing the health costs (HC)
with the relative application time saved (AS) assumes that the health costs
are a direct result of the exposure to pesticides, which will be reduced with
less time spent on spraying. The benefits are assumed to be linear in rela-
tive time saved, are additive and should be interpreted as the expected
discounted sum. They can be written as
B  (PC  HC)AS (2)
The pesticide costs, PC, are the monetary expenses on pesticides, PA,
and the time used for spraying, L, valued at the opportunity costs of labour
spraying pesticides, w1
PC  PA  L · w1 (3)
The health costs, HC, are the monetary expenses for medical treatment,
hc, such as hospital fees and medicine, plus the number of non-working
days due to health problems resulting from the application of pesticides,
SD, valued with the labour costs w2
HC  hc  SD · w2 (4)
Also
hc, w*, w1, w2, L, PA, SD  0, 0  AS  1, w*  w1 (5)
As the adoption of IPM substitutes capital (expenses for pesticides) and
low skill labour (time spent for spraying) with high skill labour (obser-
vation of pests and diseases), the cost for the farmer is the time he has to
spend to learn and apply the technology, IPMld, weighted with his own
opportunity costs of time, w*
C  IPMld · w* (6)
Equation (2) to equation (6) can be combined and rearranged to show
the boundary between adoption and non-adoption, where IPMb is the
number of labour days at B  C
IPMb w*  (PA  Lw1)AS  (hc  SDw2)AS
IPMb  
(PA 
w
L
*
w1)AS 
(hc  S
w
D
*
w2)AS (7)
The farmer will start to adopt IPM as long as the time he has to spend on
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IPM, IPMld, is below the boundary, IPMb, and not if IPMld  IPMb.
Equation (1) can then be written as
IPM  { 1 if IPMld  IPMbIPM  0 if IPMld  IPMb (1)
The boundary between adoption, applying IPM, and non-adoption,
applying FBP, is the maximum number of days to be spent for an IPM
(IPMld) strategy (see also figure 1):
If the adoption of IPM requires less labour days than the number of
labour days saved, it is optimal for the farmer to adopt IPM and he will
find himself in the ‘adoption’ area of figure 1. On the other hand, if the
adoption of IPM requires more labour days than benefits converted into
the number of labour days, he would be better off not adopting IPM.
Equation (7) includes opportunity costs of labour. The opportunity costs
of labour may be the same, but this is not necessarily the case. It is
important to note that w* represents the opportunity costs of the decision
maker, because the time spent on IPM, IPMld, which includes the necessary
training on IPM technology, is assumed to be the time spent by the farmer.
He would only employ labour for spraying as long as the labour costs are
lower than his own opportunity costs for conducting that specific task. If
the labour costs are higher than his own opportunity costs he could
increase his income by applying the pesticides himself.
The model includes the extreme case of an IPM strategy where no pesti-
cides are applied. This is the case when the amount of application time
saved, AS, equals 100 per cent. What the model also implies is that the
higher the benefits from IPM, the more likely IPM is to be adopted. As the
marginal benefits of IPM will be higher the higher the health and pesticide
costs of FBP, the rate of adoption will be higher in areas of high pesticide
use and high impact on farmers’ health. Therefore the success of IPM will
be greater in areas of high environmental deterioration.
3. Different forms of labour organization in agriculture
In agriculture, labour is commonly organized in family farms in which
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Figure 1. Boundary between adoption and non-adoption of IPM
family members conduct both managerial and operational tasks. This is often
a transaction cost-minimizing way of labour organization in agriculture
(Schmitt, 1991; Roumasset, 1995; Allen and Lueck, 1998; Beckmann, 2000).
However, for certain tasks it is quite common that management and oper-
ation is divided either between different household members or between
household members and hired farm labourers, who are employed either on
a contract (short-term) or permanent (long-term) basis (see Hayami and
Otsuka, 1993; Beckmann, 1996). Such division of labour arises if the oppor-
tunity costs of labour differ between household members or between
household members and hired farm labourers1 in such a way that they out-
weigh the transaction costs associated with any division of labour
(Beckmann, 1996; Roumasset, 1995; Becker and Murphy, 1992). Our model
allows for differentiation between these different types of labour organiz-
ation by assuming different opportunity costs of labour. The model applies
also to sharecropping arrangements. In this case the decision maker would
be the sharecropper.2 For simplicity, we do not consider transaction costs
here. The following scenarios are possible:
scenario 1: w*  w1  w2
scenario 2: w*  w1  w2
scenario 3: w*  w1 ∧ w2  0
In scenario 1 all opportunity costs are equal. There is no incentive for the
division of labour. This describes a family farm, where the person applying
the pesticides is also the one who will practice IPM, which is common for
small-holder rice production in Southeast Asia (Barker and Herdt, 1985).
Under scenario 2 the opportunity costs are different in that it is advan-
tageous to divide labour. The person applying the pesticides is different
from the one conducting the observations on pests and diseases. This is the
case where farm labourers or other family members apply the pesticides,
which is common for intensive vegetable and fruit production (e.g. Lewis,
1992; Wesseler, 1996) and larger farms.
Scenario 3 is equal to scenario 2, except that the farmer ignores the health
costs of the farm labourer (or the member of the family applying pesti-
cides), which can be described as the case where labourers are hired for
spraying on a daily basis.
Other possible scenarios would assume non-maximizing behaviour and
will therefore not be pursued further.
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1 The opportunity costs of labour can differ with respect to individual character-
istics such as sex, age, education, or more general human capital. These
differences in the opportunity costs of labour between household members have
been recognized in the literature mainly to explain differences in individual off-
farm work decisions (e.g. Huffman, 1980; Schluz-Greve, 1995).
2 The efficient level of input use under sharecropping is less than under an owner-
operator tenure system, if all the costs including the opportunity costs of labour
but except the share are the same. As the opportunity costs of labour of the share-
cropper in general are less than the opportunity costs of the landowner, the
efficient amount of other inputs increases. Whether or not the total of the two
effects will lead to a higher level of pesticide use under FBP is an empirical ques-
tion.
4. Changes in opportunity costs of labour and the impact on the
adoption of IPM
The three scenarios and the impact of changes in the labour market can be
analysed by calculating the partial derivatives. A numerical example,
which is based on experiences from agricultural production in the
Philippines where all three scenarios can be observed, will be used to illus-
trate the results. In the example, the labour costs w1, w2, w* are assumed to
range from 0 up to 120 pesos per day. The expenses for pesticides, PA, are
assumed to be 4000 pesos, the time used for pesticide application, L, 20
days, the health costs, hc, to be 1000 pesos, the number of non-working
days, SD, to be ten days and the time saved, AS, to be 20 per cent and all
per cropping season and on a per hectare basis. The numbers are close to
those provided in the study by Pingali et al. (1994) on pesticide use and
farmers’ health in Philippine rice production.
For the first scenario, the owner-operated farm, the chance of adopting
IPM decreases with an increase in labour costs
 	  0 (8a)
 2 ·  0 (8b)
This is a result one would initially expect. As labour costs increase, the
maximum time the farmer would be willing to spend on IPM decreases.
Hence the comparative advantage of IPM decreases and (as equation (8b)
shows) at a decreasing rate, which is also illustrated in figure 2. In this case
labour market policies that increase the opportunity costs of labour would
result in a move along the border function to the right. This reduces the
maximum amount of time to be spent on IPM if adopted from an economic
point of view. Generally speaking, an increase in the opportunity costs of
labour will decrease the comparative advantage of IPM and hence the rate
of adoption. The rate of change of the comparative advantage of IPM
decreases when opportunity costs of labour increase. Therefore, labour
policies that increase labour costs, such as minimum wage policies, will
decrease the competitiveness of IPM strategies, but at a decreasing rate.
This causes a problem for policy decision makers as many countries like
Indonesia and the Philippines (Betcherman and Islam, 2001) have adopted
an IPM strategy as part of the agriculture policy supported by the FAO and
the World Bank while at the same time they have implemented a national
minimum wage policy.3
The result also indicates an environmental conflict of IPM. In FFSs
farmers are trained on IPM. This, it has been argued, not only improves
knowledge related to IPM but improves awareness and learning capabili-
ties in general and thus improves the human capital. The increase in
(PA  hc)AS

(w*)3

IPM


(w*)2
(PA  hc)AS

(w*)2

IPM


w*
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3 As one reviewer correctly observed, the effectiveness of the minimum wage policy
in the agriculture sector is questionable as it is often not enforced. An enforcement
of the policy in the non-agricultural sector increases, ceteris paribus, the oppor-
tunity costs of labour and leads to our conclusions.
human capital increases the possibilities for better-paid off-farm work as
e.g. Huffman (1980) has shown for the United States. An increase in the off-
farm wage rate decreases the competitiveness of IPM. That is, on the one
hand, the introduction of successful FFSs, meaning where farmers are well
trained on IPM, may lead to less adoption of IPM and less expected ex-ante
environmental benefits. On the other hand, the increase in off-farm work
increases the benefits of FFSs for the farmer even more than if he/she
would have adopted IPM. This hypothesis can be tested empirically and if
correct would support the argument that FFSs generate measurable ben-
efits also to those who participated in IPM training, but did not adopt the
technology.
The second scenario, where the opportunity costs between the decision
maker and the person applying the pesticides differ, provides the fol-
lowing partial derivatives
  0 (9a)
 0 (9b)
 	
(PA 
(w
L
*
·
)2
w1)AS	
(hc  S
(w
D
*)
·
2
w2)AS 0 (10a)
 2 
(PA 
(w
L
*
·
)3
w1)AS 2 
(hc  S
(w
D
*)
·
3
w2)AS 0 (10b)
Equation (9a) shows that an increase in the opportunity costs of farm
labourers will increase the competitive advantage of IPM. The economic
interpretation is that the higher the opportunity costs of the farm labourer,
the more expensive it is for the farmer to lose farm labour due to health
problems from pesticide application. Also, the benefits from saving time
on spraying pesticides increase with an increase in the opportunity costs of
the farm labour. Hence, the competitiveness of IPM increases with an
increase in the health costs and the pesticide application of farm labourers.

IPM


w2

IPM


w*

IPM


(w1)
2
(L  SD)AS

w*

IPM


w1
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Figure 2. IPM adoption boundary function of owner-operated pest management
The steeper line in figure 3 shows the IPM adoption boundary function
under constant opportunity costs of the decision maker and variable
labour costs for pesticide application.
The results shown in equations (9a) and (9b) have important implications
for labour market policies and the adoption of IPM. An increase in the
minimum wage rate of hired farm labour will have a positive constant
impact on the comparative advantage of IPM. The division of labour can
explain the difference compared to the first scenario. As the farmer is
assumed to be the one responsible for observing the field and deciding
what kind of pest control strategy will be used, but not the one actually
spraying the field, an increase in labour costs in spraying increases the costs
of pesticide application and hence increases the comparative advantage of
IPM. Therefore, we expect, that the adoption of IPM among farmers with a
division in labour among household members or long-term hired labour is
higher than among owner-operated farms. The same effect, higher adop-
tion rates, could be achieved by training those members of the households
who apply the pesticides on IPM, if this increases the reservation wage.
If the farmer uses only short-term labour for pesticide application, he can
ignore the number of days short-term labourers cannot work because of sick-
ness. The monetary expenses of the short-term labour cannot be ignored by
the farmer as it can be expected that the short-term labourers will try to recover
some of the expenses either by requiring a higher salary in advance or an
additional payment at the occurrence of health problems.4 In this case, shown
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Figure 3. IPM adoption boundary function when pesticides are applied by family
members, permanent farm labour, or short-term hired labour under variable labour
costs and constant opportunity costs of the farm manager
4 The observation of a higher salary should not be confused with our statement
about the wage rates, w*  w1, as this will still hold. If the opposite will be
observed in the field, our interpretation is that hired labour were able to inter-
nalize at least some of the health costs and w*  w  HC, with HC  w* 	 w 
w 	 w*.
in the third scenario, as the labour costs for spraying increase the comparative
advantage of IPM increases at aconstant rate (equation (11a)). The explanation
is the same as before, but compared to the second scenario the rate of change
will be lower as the number of sick days, SD, is ignored. Hence, the slope of the
boundary function will be less steep compared to the situation including all
the health costs and adopting IPM will be less likely (see figure 3).
  0 (11a)
 0 (11b)
 	  0 (12a)
 2  0 (12b)
In the case of changing opportunity costs of the farmer the comparative
advantage of IPM decreases at a decreasing rate regardless of the three
forms of labour organization analysed. However, the rate of change is
lower for owner-operated farms and highest for farms where family
members or permanent labourers apply the pesticides, as can be seen by
comparing equations (8a), (10a), and (12a). The impact of the opportunity
costs of the farmer on the adoption of IPM under three different forms of
labour organization are illustrated in figure 4. The competitive advantage
of IPM is highest under owner-operated pesticide application, followed by
family or permanent-hired-labour-operated pesticide application and
finally short-term-hired-labour-operated pesticide application. This result
offers an additional explanation to the one provided by Griliches (1957) 
on the adoption of technical change by farmers, which was explained by
(PA  L · w1  hc)AS
(w*)3

IPM


(w1)
2
(PA  L · w1  hc)AS
(w*)2

IPM


w*

IPM


(w1)
2
L · AS

w*

IPM


w1
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Figure 4. IPM boundary function when pesticides are applied by farm labour
under constant farm labour costs and variable opportunity costs of the farm
manager
differences in profitability due to increases in yield. Our results suggest
that also the form of labour organization is important.
In conclusion, the organization of labour has important implications for
the adoption of IPM strategies under changing opportunity costs. In a
comparative static perspective, low opportunity costs of labour for the
decision maker and high opportunity costs for those who apply pesticides
will increase the rate of adoption. If, for example, the opportunity costs of
the decision maker rise, and he decides to work off-farm, this will reduce
the probability of adopting IPM regardless of how the work is organized
(figure 4). However, if the work is divided between the decision maker and
other household members or hired labour, and their opportunity costs
remain unchanged, the probability of adopting IPM will be even lower.
Furthermore, the probability of adopting IPM will decrease with an
increase in the organization of labour markets. If the pesticides are applied
either by other members of the family or by permanent hired labour the
probability of adopting IPM will be lower. If the labour market is orga-
nized in such a way as to allow the hiring of short-term labour for pesticide
application, the probability of adopting IPM will decrease further. Also,
the probability of adopting IPM will be greater the higher the labour costs
of other family members, permanent and short-term hired labour. This is
contrary to the situation where pesticides are applied by the decision
maker as explained earlier.
5. Conclusions
This paper presents a model that allows the identification of the threshold
at the farm level for adopting an IPM strategy conditional on the organ-
ization and the opportunity costs of labour. The results show that under
owner-operated pesticide application an overall increase in opportunity
costs of labour decreases the competitiveness of IPM compared to FBP.
This is a fairly obvious result in view of the known implications of labour
market policies on the adoption of IPM. The results change if division of
labour is assumed, an observation which is common in agriculture.
Depending on the organization of agricultural labour, an increase in
labour costs can increase the competitive advantage of IPM. Labour
market policies that increase the minimum wage rate of hired farm labour
will increase the probability of IPM adoption, while policies that increase
the opportunities of the decision maker will decrease the probability of
IPM adoption. While under owner-operated pesticide application, the
impact of labour market policies in this case would be inversely related
to agricultural and environmental policies. We also show that under a
differentiated organization of labour, the possibility exists that agricul-
tural policies, environmental policies, and labour market policies can go
hand in hand. Unfortunately, this will be more likely at a higher original
level of pesticide use and hence a higher level of environmental deterio-
ration.
The results have important implications for further empirical research
on the adoption of IPM and ex-ante impact assessment. Up to now, the
impact of the organization of labour on the rate of adoption of IPM has
been largely ignored (e.g. most recently Maumbe and Swinton, 2000).
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In empirical research, we would expect that, ceteris paribus, the rate of
IPM adoption is lower in regions or farms where the decision maker faces
higher opportunity costs of labour (e.g. work off-farm). This result is
expected independent from the labour organization. Further, we would
expect that, ceteris paribus, the rate of adoption is lower in regions or
farms where relatively cheap family or hired labour can be employed for
pesticide application.
For ex-ante impact assessment, e.g. the introduction of IPM in regions
where the original level of pesticide use was low with the aim of pre-
venting an increase in pesticide use in the future (Waibel, 1999, p. 13), it
could be stated that this will be less successful in areas with high oppor-
tunity costs and for a more differentiated organization of agricultural
labour. Additional economic incentives have to be provided to encourage
the adoption of IPM under these circumstances.
In this respect, a lot of emphasis has been placed on training farmers on
IPM to raise their awareness about IPM in the hope ‘that these efforts 
pay off in experimentation and knowledge creation by farmers themselves,
and ultimately to sustained IPM practice by them’ (Feder and Quizon,
1999, p. 5). Our findings suggest, that again these pay-offs will be less in
regions with high opportunity costs and a more differentiated organiz-
ation of agricultural labour, but not because farmers are not aware but
because of the economic incentives for adoption.
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